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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that civil servants can perceive their role differently and that these 
differing perceptions also influence their responses to managerial reform programs. Yet there 
is little research examining how different role perceptions influence the application of 
performance measurement. Using survey data from 742 human service organizations in 
Switzerland, the present study addresses this gap by investigating how professional and 
managerial role identities affect managers’ use of performance information. The results 
support the hypotheses that role identities indirectly influence the application of performance 
information through the effects on role conflict that may occur when managerial professionals 
measure the performance of their organizations. A lack of resources, stringent political 
control, and poor information quality are also found to be associated with role conflict and a 
limited use of performance information.  
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Introduction  
Reform initiatives inspired by the New Public Management (NPM) movement and demands 
to invest in performance measurement have led to the emergence of new responsibilities for 
public and nonprofit sector executives. In order to demonstrate that public funding is spent 
efficiently and effectively, managers are encouraged - or forced, to track measurable targets, 
manage and control achievements by using performance information, and report the 
performance of the organization to public authorities (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008). Against 
this background, several scholars have argued that NPM is an “identity project”, since public 
management reforms promote new work roles that require an alteration of priorities, values, 
and self-definitions (du Gay, 1996; Horton, 2006; Rondeaux, 2006). Much of the literature 
assumes that public sector reforms based on private management principles will replace or 
complement executives’ traditional orientations with business-like values and corresponding 
managerial identities (Bourgault & Van Dorpe, 2013; Emery & Giauque, 2014; Meyer, 
Egger-Peitler, Höllerer, & Hammerschmid, 2014). In this context, scholars have also 
highlighted the resulting tensions for those who try to balance the competing, and at times 
conflicting, orientations in the public sector (Poulsen, 2007; Tummers, Vermeeren, Steijn, & 
Bekkers, 2012; Van der Wal, De Graaf, & Lawton, 2011). 
Despite the growing prevalence of performance measurement, an effective application 
of performance information remains a critical issue in many measurement systems (Ammons 
& Rivenbark, 2008; de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001). Studying the use and non-use of 
performance data, previous research has identified a range of factors that foster or constrain 
the utilization of performance information for internal management (for a review see Kroll, 
2015a). However, a relatively small number of studies to date have explored how 
performance information use is influenced by managers’ personal values, beliefs, and 
identities. Scholars have therefore called for further research on the impact of managers’ 
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personal attributes and role identities on the utilization of performance information (Kroll, 
2014, 2015a). 
The present article takes this shortcoming in the literature as its starting point and aims 
to improve our understanding of how role identities matter for the use of performance 
information in at least two important respects. First, unlike previous research that focused on 
top public administrators in generic settings of public administration, we explore the role 
identities of leading professionals in specialized human service organizations. The executives 
in human service fields deserve more attention because the increasing demands for 
performance measurement signify a profound shift from professional ethics and standards for 
working directly with clients to a managed service provision with a stronger emphasis on 
organizational performance, requiring leading professionals to take on new managerial roles 
and responsibilities (Causer & Exworthy, 1999; Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd, & Walker, 2005). 
Against this backdrop, the current analysis contributes to the literature by examining how 
managerial professionals identify themselves with traditional and new role conceptions and 
whether their varying self-definitions affect the perception and application of performance 
measurement.  
A second key contribution of this study is that we pay special attention to tensions 
during the application of performance measurement that may arise as a result of conflicting 
values and norms. This emphasis is important because scholars have suggested that the 
managerial logic inherent in performance measurement is at odds with professional values 
and standards (Flynn, 1999; van der Veen, 2013). There is, however, little empirical evidence 
showing whether, and with what consequences, executives with a professional background 
experience such inconsistent values and norms. This is why we introduce the concept of role 
conflict and link it to executives’ role identities and reliance on performance data. The 
research question at the core of this study is how performance information use is affected by 
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professional and managerial role identities and whether these relationships are mediated by 
role conflicts experienced by professionals in charge of management functions. 
The present article proceeds as follows. We begin by reviewing the existing literature 
regarding impact factors for performance information use and then refer to identity theory, in 
order to outline our hypotheses for the relationships between role identities, role conflict and 
performance information use. Next, as described in the methodological section of the article, 
we illustrate these linkages by using structural equation modeling with survey data from 742 
human service organizations in Switzerland. The findings indicate that a managerial role 
identity is a crucial individual disposition that fosters performance information use in various 
ways. In contrast, a professional self-concept is found to hamper data usage, though less 
directly and to a much lesser extent than it is fostered by a managerial identity. The article 
concludes with a discussion of its contributions, limitations, and implications. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Drivers of Performance Information Use 
As large numbers of public and nonprofit organizations have undertaken substantial efforts in 
the development of measurement systems and performance indicators, a growing body of 
research has begun to focus on the actual use of the information generated. Addressing this 
topic, scholars have conceptualized performance information use in various ways (cf. Behn, 
2003; Van Dooren, Bouckaert, & Halligan, 2010), but their main focus has been devoted to a 
purposeful use of performance data. This type of utilization refers to the application of 
systematic feedback information with the goal of improving public services through goal-
based learning, better targeting of resources, and better-informed decisions (Kroll, 2015a; 
Moynihan, Pandey, & Wright, 2012). Since this is the actual objective of most performance 
measurement interventions, it is of crucial importance to understand the conditions conducive 
to performance information use. 
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A systematic review of potential impact factors on data use by Kroll (2015a) has 
shown that organizational variables such as measurement system maturity, leadership support, 
and organizational culture are the most frequently tested influences on the application of 
performance information. Stressing the importance of cultural influences, scholars have 
argued that an actor's ability to learn and develop further depends not only on an 
organization’s analytical capacity but also on the degree to which the organizational culture 
promotes continuous improvement, appreciates additional feedback information, and accepts 
performance measurement routines as an appropriate organizational behavior (Moynihan, 
2005; Taylor, 2011). Other studies have alluded to the importance of a supportive 
environment that helps an organization to obtain the necessary trust, autonomy, and resources 
for building or utilizing internal management capacity (Yang & Hsieh, 2007; Yang & Pandey, 
2009).  
Given that managers, as potential users of performance data, always have some degree 
of discretion, scholars have also emphasized the importance of individual manager-related 
characteristics. In particular, it has been noted that managers who have positive attitudes 
toward performance measurement and are convinced of its benefits in terms of improving 
management and services are more willing to take the extra effort associated with the 
consideration and use of performance information (Kroll, 2015a; Moynihan, Pandey, & 
Wright, 2012; Taylor, 2011). As regards the impact of managers’ identities on data use, 
Hammerschmid and coauthors (2014) demonstrated that top officials with a managerial role 
identity make more internal use of performance information. Kroll (2014), on the contrary, 
failed to find any significant link between public administrators’ identity and their reliance on 
data usage. In the light of these inconclusive results, our study helps to clarify whether and 
how identities affect the utilization of performance information. 
Role Identities and their Evolvement in the Context of Reform 
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Over the last few years, public servant’s identities and their evolvement in the context of 
managerial reform programs has attracted growing interest in public management research 
(Berg, 2006; Bourgault & Van Dorpe, 2013; de Graaf, 2011; Meyer et al., 2014; Rondeaux, 
2006). Identities (or, more specifically, role identities) are defined as “self-conceptions, self-
referent cognitions, or self-definitions that people apply to themselves as a consequence of the 
structural role positions they occupy” (Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995, p. 256). Since persons 
are typically embedded in multiple groups and role-relationships, identity theory asserts that 
persons have multiple identities which are ordered hierarchically, such that the identities at 
the top of the salience hierarchy are most likely to be activated (Stryker, 1968). The activation 
of an identity then leads to a cognitive process of self-verification in which the person 
behaves so as to maintain consistency with his or her role perception (Burke, 1991; Stets & 
Burke, 2000). Identity theory thus hypothesizes that the higher the salience of an identity 
relative to other identities, the higher the probability of behavioral choices in accord with the 
incorporated values and norms attached to that identity (Stryker & Burke, 2000). 
Prior research seems to confirm the assumption that identities evolve as a result of 
management reforms. Bourgault and Van Dorpe (2013), for instance, find that role identities 
of top civil servants have changed from an emphasis on enforcing rules on guarding the public 
interest towards leading people through changes and ensuring an efficient use of resources. 
Notwithstanding this, they did not find the emergence of a pure managerial identity in the four 
European countries examined. Rather, the bureaucrat, policy advisor or professional identity 
persists in the civil service. These findings coincide with results from other studies that 
indicate a persistence of bureaucratic and professional identities alongside new managerial 
self-concepts in the civil service (de Graaf, 2011; Poulsen, 2007) or emphasize the emergence 
of hybrid identities that combine traditional and managerial principles (Berg, 2006; Meyer & 
Hammerschmid, 2006; Rondeaux, 2006). Consequently, there are now various different role 
concepts for civil servants to identify with. 
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Changing Roles, Identification Process, and Role Conflict  
Although changing roles may have implications for the self-definitions of public 
administrators and professionals, new roles are unlikely to fully determine an individual’s 
identity and behavior. Individuals always need to interpret a particular work role and identify 
themselves with the expectations that are attached to that role (Halford & Leonard, 1999). In 
the context of contemporary managerial reform programs, for instance, leading professionals 
will interpret their managerial role on the basis of their existing beliefs and self-concepts, and, 
by doing so, try to achieve correspondence between the associated role expectations and their 
self-definition (Poulsen, 2007; Stets & Burke, 2000). It is this process of identification which 
creates new managerial identities, but also leads to dilemmas and role conflict when new 
demands stand in opposition to an individuals’ existing beliefs and identities. 
According to the social psychological literature, role conflict occurs when a role 
incumbent feels that two or more expectations imposed on him or her are incompatible (Katz 
& Kahn, 1978). On this basis, Tummers et al. (2012) suggest that public professionals often 
experience a ‘policy-professional role conflict’ during policy implementation, namely when 
professionals perceive the role requirements demanded by the policy to be incongruent with 
professional values, norms, or behaviors. This is particularly the case when the policy has a 
strong focus on economic goals such as efficiency and financial transparency, or when the use 
of performance management systems and output controls are enforced (Tummers, Bekkers, & 
Steijn, 2009). As a result, professionals are often unwilling to implement such policies. Berg 
(2006) provides some further evidence that middle and lower level managers often share the 
concerns of front-line service professionals regarding public management reforms and react 
with resistance to these initiatives when they perceive managerial principles and tools as 
being incompatible with their professional identity (see also Kirkpatrick et al., 2005). When 
such incompatibilities or conflicts emerge during the implementation of performance 
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measurement, consequences can also be expected regarding the use of performance 
information. Managers’ perception that data collection and consideration routines are at odds 
with their own values and beliefs may well raise skepticism as to the appropriateness of such 
practices and, consequently, increase their reluctance to invest extra time and effort into data 
usage. 
Linking Identities and Role Conflict to Data Usage 
Performance management interventions embody a set of expectations of how managerial 
professionals should behave (Moynihan & Hawes, 2012). Instead of focusing on professional 
procedures and standards, they are supposed to focus on results and rely on performance 
information when making decisions (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008; Emery & Giauque, 2003). 
The way executives actually interpret this set of expected behaviors and live up to them, as 
explained above, takes place on the basis of the internalized beliefs and values that make up 
their self-concepts. On these grounds, we assume that role identities provide a fruitful 
approach to the exploration of how personal attributes of managers influence a purposeful use 
of performance information. 
Performance measurement is one means of achieving a managerial logic that 
emphasizes businesslike values such as efficiency, innovativeness, risk-taking, 
responsiveness, and transparency (Horton, 2006; Kroll, 2014; Van der Wal et al., 2011). This 
closely fits the values and beliefs generally associated with a managerial identity. Hence, 
executives who see themselves mainly as managers are likely to consider performance 
measurement as an appropriate organizational routine, since the associated requirements are 
highly consistent with the values and beliefs that make up their self-concept. Given this 
compatibility, we assume that the higher the salience of a managerial role identity, the less 
likely is the experience of role conflict and the greater a person’s willingness to invest some 
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extra effort for a purposeful use of performance information. This can be hypothesized as 
follows: 
H1a: A higher level of a managerial role identity will have an indirect, positive effect 
on performance information use through its diminishing effect on role conflict. 
Traditional role conceptions in many public and nonprofit organizations are related to 
professional standards for case treatment, code of ethics, principles of discretion and peer-
control (Flynn, 1999; Freidson, 2001; Hupe & van der Krogt, 2013). A distinct professional 
identity linked to the specialized skills for the solution of human problems asserts a greater 
devotion to the public good rather than the economic efficiency of work (Freidson, 2001; 
Halford & Leonard, 1999). Given that many managers were formerly employed in 
professional roles or remain involved in professional practice, it can be assumed that they are 
familiar with professional principles of practice (Tummers et al., 2012).  
Numerous studies show that professional orientations centering on the individual 
client, equal treatment, discretion, and equity are difficult to align with a managerial logic 
with a strong emphasis on organizational issues, standardization, control, and businesslike 
values such as efficiency (Berg, 2006; Emery & Giauque, 2003; Flynn, 1999; Tummers et al., 
2009). When taking on managerial responsibilities, managerial professionals may thus be 
faced with multiple, potentially conflicting objectives, values and modes of occupational 
control. Based on this, we assume that executives who see themselves mainly as professionals 
are more likely to perceive an incompatibility between their internalized beliefs and the 
required practices for performance measurement, giving rise to the experience of role conflict. 
The occurrence of role conflict, in turn, is likely to decrease a person’s willingness to invest 
extra time and effort in data usage because it reinforces doubts about the appropriateness of 
this behavior and leads to less positive attitudes toward performance measurement practices. 
We thus hypothesize: 
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H1b: A higher level of a professional role identity will have an indirect, negative effect 
on performance information use through its augmentative effect on role conflict. 
Of course, performance information use is not just a matter of identity. For example, 
adequate resources in regards to time, personnel, and technical capacity have repeatedly been 
found to foster performance information use because they facilitate sustained data collection 
and analysis (de Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Moynihan & Landuyt, 2009). Moreover, it is 
reasonable to assume that the availability of resources to accomplish necessary managerial 
tasks can also influence managers’ experience of role conflict. When a person’s existing 
resources are insufficient to fulfill particular role expectations, he or she may experience an 
incongruence between demands and capacity, which leads to role conflict (Rizzo, House, & 
Lirtzman, 1970). On these grounds, we assume that resource adequacy facilitates a more 
pragmatic handling of measurement requirements, decreases potential role conflicts, and 
thereby leads to a higher level of performance information use. Since we are primarily 
interested in this indirect effect, we hypothesize: 
H2a: The availability of resources for performance measurement will have an indirect, 
positive effect on performance information use through its diminishing effect on role 
conflict. 
The degree of managerial authority – or the degree of political control as its restriction - 
represents another potential influence on performance information use. If managers have the 
capacity to make decisions and initiate change, they have greater incentive to identify and 
solve problems based on performance information (Moynihan & Pandey, 2010; Swiss, 2005). 
For this reason, performance interventions and the underlying idea of ‘managerialism’ call not 
only for a greater focus on results, but also pretend to increase managerial authority and scope 
for action (Ritz & Sager, 2010). Notwithstanding this, performance measurement has often 
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been introduced without providing managers any enhanced operational autonomy (Dull, 2009; 
Moynihan, 2006).  
In practice, the devolution of authority and control is frequently challenged by a series 
of new formal rules, obligations, and contractual arrangements that tends to tighten control 
over public service delivery and to increase the influence of external political authority (van 
der Veen, 2013; Lægreid, Opedal, & Stigen, 2005), also referred to hereinafter as ‘political 
control’. This is likely to affect managers’ willingness to use performance information. If 
managers’ flexibility is restricted by many constraints of political control, as Swiss (2005) 
argues, they will be little inclined to use performance information for decision-making and 
improvement efforts. Furthermore, under conditions of stringent external oversight and 
scrutiny, managers may see performance measurement as a control arrangement and as a 
threat to professional discretion, rather than as a support for internal management (Ammons 
& Rivenbark, 2008). Since this is likely to exacerbate the perceived gap between 
measurement requirements and a manager’s own goals or self-concept, we assume that a 
higher level of political control is positively associated with the experience of role conflict 
which, in turn, hampers a purposeful use of performance information. This leads us to the last 
hypothesis: 
H2b: Perceived political control will have an indirect, negative effect on performance 
information use through its augmentative effect on role conflict. 
Data and Method 
Sample 
The research population consist of approximately 2.300 specialized human service 
organizations in the German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland. It includes public and 
nonprofit facilities that represent five major areas of human services in Switzerland in which 
the legislative and regulatory authorities regard the application of management systems as a 
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central strategy for better management and improved service quality. The facilities included in 
this study are regulated and supervised mainly by the cantons, while services are usually 
provided by public authorities at the local level and by numerous nonprofit organizations. It 
should be mentioned here that the strong federal structure of Switzerland has resulted in a 
highly decentralized welfare system, in terms of control, financing and implementation 
(Bonoli & Champion, 2015). As a consequence of this, Switzerland does not have an 
accessible national database that includes all human service organizations. This is why this 
study includes only facilities with membership in a professional association, whose share is 
about 90 percent of the total population. 
An online survey was sent to 2.047 executive directors during the summer of 2015 and 
achieved a 37.7 percent response rate (n = 772)1. A total of 30 questionnaires were excluded 
from the analysis because the corresponding organizations did not collect any performance 
information at all. Among the remaining 742 human service organizations, nursing homes are 
most common (52%), followed by facilities for the disabled (22%). Work integration (10%) 
and children and youth institutions (9%) represent the third and fourth largest fields, while 
specialized facilities for drug addicts are the smallest group in the sample (7%). The 
proportion of public organizations is 24 percent, while the remainder is nonprofits relying to a 
large extent on public funding. More than half of the study participants (55%) are qualified 
social workers, social pedagogues, psychologists, or health professionals with an average 8 
years of professional experience. Another 23 percent hold a degree in economics or received 
formal training in management, most of them (79%) with several years of work experience in 
the commercial sector. The remainder is distributed across numerous other occupations. 
Among all respondents, 70 percent were male, and the average age was 54 years. The median 
tenure in the current position fell between 7-9 years. 
Study Measures 
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All study variables were measured using indices consisting of multiple survey items ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), unless otherwise noted. Most questionnaire 
items were adapted from the existing literature and translated from the source language 
(English) into the target languages (German and French), following the procedure 
recommended by Brislin (1980). Appendix 1 contains more detailed information on variable 
measurement. 
Performance information use is measured by an index of five items adopted from 
Moynihan, Pandey, and Wright (2012) and Kroll (2014). The index (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92) 
captures managers’ purposeful application of performance information for common purposes 
of data usage such as learning, decision-making, and control. 
To measure the executive directors’ role identities, two indices are constructed each 
based on four statements from the existing literature that reflect various requests, objectives 
and standards that respondents may associate with their role (cf. Bourgault & Van Dorpe, 
2013; de Graaf, 2011). The managerial role identity scale (α = 0.80) indicates the extent to 
which the respondents identify themselves with a set of objectives and principles that are 
typically associated with a managerial role conception. The professional role identity scale (α 
= 0.79) reflects the traditional role perception in human service organizations and 
encompasses the extent to which the respondents regard professional principles as constitutive 
elements for their role. Factor analysis supports the two-factor solution, indicating that the 
identity types under consideration are two distinct forms of self-definition.2 
Role conflict (α = 0.82) is measured using four items from the policy-professional role 
conflict scale developed by Tummers et al. (2012). Tummers and colleagues conceptualized 
three types of role conflict on the policy level, and the corresponding scales have been used to 
measure the experience of role conflicts among mental healthcare professionals when 
implementing the reimbursement policy known as Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs). One 
advantage of these scales is that all items can be rephrased to specify a particular policy being 
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examined. For practical reasons, we confine ourselves in this study to the policy-professional 
role conflict, which has been proved to be most influential in explaining public professional’s 
willingness to implement (DRG) policies. The role conflict scale employed in this study 
captures the extent to which respondents perceive that performance measurement conflicts 
with their professional attitudes, values, and norms. 
 We include two additional variables that may influence performance information use 
as well as the experience of role conflict. First, we consider an index for measurement-related 
resources, such as time, money, personnel, and technical support capabilities for performance 
measurement. The index (α = 0.84) is composed of three items adapted from de Lancer and 
Holzer (2001) and Dull (2009b). Second, we measure the intensity of political control with a 
three-item index (α = 0.74) assessing the degree to which executive managers perceive the 
legal requirements and administrative regulation to constrain their organization’s autonomy 
and independence, broadly following Lægreid et al. (2005). 
In addition, we include goal clarity and information quality as control variables 
because both have repeatedly been found to be related to performance information use (cf. 
Kroll, 2015a). Goal clarity (α = 0.74) is measured using a three-item scale developed by 
Rainey (1983). Information quality (α = 0.92) is measured using five items from Kroll 
(2015b). The range consists of seven response categories from “very poor” to “excellent”. To 
control for a possible sector effect, we include a dummy variable for an organization’s 
ownership form (public vs. nonprofit). Lastly, gender and current job tenure are included to 
control for individual differences among respondents. Table 1 presents the descriptive 
statistics for each variable and the correlations. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
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Analytical Procedure 
In the present study, the challenge for the statistical analysis is to detect the indirect effects of 
four measures (managerial and professional role identity, resources, and political control) on 
performance information use via a mediating factor (role conflict). Structural equation 
modeling (SEM) was applied for this analysis as it provides an effective and direct way of 
testing hypothesized relationships among latent constructs, specifying and estimating 
mediated relationships, and for taking measurement errors into account (Bollen, 1989). The 
calculations were performed with the lavaan package in R. 
A two-step approach was chosen for data analysis, following the recommendations of 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988). Prior to testing the hypotheses, we conducted confirmatory 
factor analyses (CFA) to assess the reliability of the study measures and test the hypothesized 
measurement model for all latent constructs. To test model fit, we used chi-squared statistics 
and multiple fit indices, as recommended by Hu and Bentler (1999). Because the inclusion of 
various types of organizations that differ in terms of ownership form, principal task, financing 
and control raises concerns as to whether the instrument possesses the same psychometric 
properties in all groups of organizations, this step also includes testing for measurement 
invariance across different areas of human services, as well as across the public and nonprofit 
sector.3 We assessed measurement invariance following the general sequence of imposing 
increasingly restrictive equality constraints across groups (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). In the 
second step, we included the observed control variables as covariates and respecified the 
measurement model to test the hypothesized relationships using SEM. 
Data screening was conducted before to assess multivariate normality, 
multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity. There was no indication of multicollinearity or 
heteroscedasticity. Given that pre-analyses of the data revealed some deviation from 
multivariate normality, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLM) was combined with 
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‘robust’ standard errors and Satorra-Bentler scaled chi-square statistics for estimations and 
model evaluation (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). All reported path coefficients are standardized. 
Analyses and Results 
Measurement Model 
For the hypothesized measurement model, in which all items were loaded on their expected 
latent construct, the model fit indices confirmed that the model fits the data well. The chi-
square to degree of freedom ratio (X
2/df = 760/398 = 1.91) met the traditional rule-of-thumb 
criteria (X
2/df < 2). The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA = 0.035) was lower 
than 0.06 and the root mean squared residual (SRMR = 0.048) was below 0.08. Both 
comparative fit index (CFI = 0.963) and Tucker Lewis index (TLI = 0.957) were above 0.95. 
Furthermore, all the factor loadings were significant at the p < 0.001 level and nontrivial in 
size (lambda values ranged from 0.57 to 0.92), providing support for the convergent validity 
of the indicators. The properties of the measurement model are summarized in appendix 2. 
 Measurement invariance was investigated by comparing the fit of various models that 
differ with respect to between-group constraints on factor loadings, item intercepts, factor 
variances and factor covariances. The properties of all models are summarized in appendix 3. 
Concerning the equivalence of the instrument across service domains, partial measurement 
invariance was established. Additional analyses to test for structural invariance revealed that 
constraining factor variances and covariances lead only to a negligible decrement in overall fit 
compared with the partial invariance model. Therefore, the assumption of an invariant range 
of scores on the latent factors and stable factor relationships across service domains is tenable. 
With regard to the equivalence of the instrument across sectors, the stepwise imposition of 
parameter constraints did not lead to any substantial decrease in model fit in any model. 
Scalar (strong) measurement invariance was thus established. The constraints on factor 
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variances and covariances are also tenable. Overall, the analyses support a high degree of 
measurement and structural invariance of the eight-factor model.  
Structural Model 
The theoretical model turned out to fit the data well: the X
2/df ratio (900/480 = 1.88) was 
below 2; RMSEA (0.034) was below 0.06 and SRMR (0.047) below 0.08. TLI (0.952) and 
CFI (0.959) were also indicative of a good data fit, being higher than 0.95. The Lagrange 
multiplier test showed that no additional path could be added to improve model fit. The Wald 
test suggests that the direct paths linking goal clarity and role conflicts as well as professional 
role identity and performance information use could be removed without substantially 
decreasing model fit. The modified and final model exhibited an almost identical data fit 
(X
2/df = 904/482 = 1.88; RMSEA = 0.034; SRMR = 0.048; CFI = 0.958; TLI = 0.952). The 
model explained about 44 percent of the data variance for performance information use and 
33 percent of the variance for the experience of role conflict. In addition, all coefficients for 
the hypothesized paths were significant at least at the p < 0.05 level and in the assumed 
direction. Standardized path coefficients, significance levels, and R-squares are reported in 
figure 1. 
Consistent with hypothesis 1a, managerial role identity has a direct effect on role 
conflict and, through this relationship, an indirect positive effect on performance information 
use (B = 0.133, z = 5.567, p < 0.01), as shown in figure 1. It further transpired that the 
mediator role conflict accounts for about half of the association between managerial role 
identity and data usage, since there is also a significant direct relationship between this 
identity type and performance information use. Conversely, professional role identity has a 
direct effect on role conflict and, only through this relationship, an indirect negative effect on 
performance information use (B = -0.040, z = -2.875, p < 0.01). This supports hypothesis 1b. 
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Compared to the effects of a managerial identity, however, the direct and indirect effects of 
professional role identity are rather weak.  
 As expected in hypothesis 2a, the availability of resources for measurement is 
negatively associated with role conflict and has an indirect positive effect on performance 
information use via this mediator (B = 0.061, z = 3.598, p < 0.01). Hypothesis 2b is also 
supported as political control is positively associated with role conflict, and through this 
mediator, has an indirect negative effect on performance information use (B = -0.058, z = -
3.644, p < 0.01). Since this negative effect is opposite in sign to the direct effect of political 
control on performance information use, also referred to as ‘inconsistent mediation’, role 
conflict acts like a suppressor variable in this case. Combined, these two effects result in a 
small and non-significant total effect. Yet mediation is present because role conflict explains 
part of the relationship. 
 Concerning control variables, information quality and job tenure are significantly 
associated with both role conflict and performance information use. When the quality of the 
available information increases, managers report less role conflict with performance 
measurement and higher scores on performance information use. The results further imply 
that more years in the current position tend to increase data use, but also have a positive 
relationship with the experience of role conflict. The other controls (ownership, gender, goal 
clarity) do not display any significant relationship with role conflict and data use. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Discussion 
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Since the extent to which measurement efforts prove to be successful greatly depends on the 
actual use of the data generated, it is of crucial importance to identify factors that are 
conducive or restrictive to performance information use. In response to calls for more studies 
examining the individual differences between managers that affect data use, the present article 
investigates human service managers’ role identities and their influence on the utilization of 
performance information. Unlike most previous research, which focused only on the direct 
effects of various independent variables on performance information use, we also take into 
account mediation effects and thereby provide a better understanding of the mechanisms by 
which managers and contextual factors shape the application of performance information.  
Our key findings confirm the important and, - to date - understudied role of 
executives’ identities for a purposeful use of performance information. It is, however, 
important to stress that a comparison of the direct and indirect effects of the two identity types 
under consideration reveals that a managerial role identity exerts a stronger and more 
straightforward effect on performance information use than a professional self-conception. As 
expected, leading professionals who predominantly experience their role as that of a manager 
undergo significantly less role conflict when measuring the performance of their organization. 
This is because the requirements associated with performance measurement are highly 
compatible with the values and beliefs that make up their self-concept.  
Independently from that, i.e. even when controlling for the level of role conflict, a 
managerial identity is positively and significantly associated with performance information 
use. This implies that a managerial identity is a crucial individual disposition that fosters data 
usage in various ways. In the public and nonprofit sectors, the introduction of management 
tools that draw heavily on performance indicators promotes a fundamental new work role for 
executives (Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006). As regards the actual use of such tools, we 
demonstrate that executives must identify with the emerging role of an active manager that 
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initiates change, leads people through transition, and ensures control that staff is pursuing 
organizational goals in an efficient way. 
But what if executives see themselves mainly as professionals? Human service 
managers who strongly identify themselves with a professional role concept experience 
greater role conflict with performance measurement, indicating that they face some 
difficulties in aligning the underlying principles with their professional beliefs. Nevertheless, 
the values and principles associated with a professional self-concept have displayed a rather 
weak link to the occurrence of role conflict and it is exclusively through this relationship that 
the professional identity type has a negative effect on performance information use. Unlike in 
the case of a managerial identity, no direct relationship between a professional identity and 
data usage has been observed. The bivariate correlation in table 1 even reveals a positive, 
though not significant, association. In sum, our results indicate that a professional self-
definition hampers performance information use to a much lesser extent than it is fostered by 
a managerial identity. This finding also indicates that – despite the observed difficulties in 
reconciling competing demands – executives with a salient professional identity do not 
perceive performance measurement as a serious threat to professional standards and 
autonomy, nor inevitably refuse the utilization of performance information. Therefore, we 
found no evidence for the popular notion of a fundamental antagonism between professional 
ideals and new management tools (Flynn, 1999; van der Veen, 2013), at least not at the 
management level examined.  
A likely explanation for our result is that, as suggested by Exworthy and Halford 
(1999), some professionals strategically embrace management techniques when climbing the 
career ladder. In less professionalized fields of social work and social care in particular, senior 
professionals may, despite some initial concerns also view those techniques as an opportunity 
to advance their professional development and to strengthen their management role 
(Kirkpatrick et al., 2005). 
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In addition to providing these insights concerning the role of identities for data usage, 
our study also contributes to a growing body of literature examining civil servants’ identities 
in the context of managerial reform programs. Our analysis reveals that managers in 
comparable organizations and positions can perceive their role differently, which, in turn, also 
shapes managerial attitudes and style of decision-making. This builds on prior research 
showing that the restructuring of public administration results in multiple identities (Bourgault 
& Van Dorpe, 2013; Meyer et al., 2014; Rondeaux, 2006) that influence public servants’ 
responses to NPM-inspired reforms (Berg, 2006).  
Our findings further coincide with results from studies indicating a persistence of 
professional orientations alongside new managerial self-concepts (Bourgault & Van Dorpe, 
2013; de Graaf, 2011). In this regard, it is worth noting that our analysis shows that the 
identity types under consideration are two distinct role perceptions, which are similarly 
strongly pronounced within human service organizations today and, interestingly, positively 
related to each other (see table 1 and footnote 2). The results thus show that executives with a 
professional background can adapt to and identify with managerial role concepts while 
retaining elements of their professional disposition. As a consequence, executives may 
simultaneously have multiple identities that vary in intensity or salience. The pattern of 
identity change thus needs to be thought of more as a complement to than a substitute for the 
traditional orientation. What this suggests for future research is that scholars should take into 
consideration that executives in similar job positions may interpret their role differently and 
exhibit multiple identities simultaneously. These further analyses could usefully be 
complemented by additional efforts to operationalize and measure more identity types with 
greater accuracy. It would then be interesting to look more thoroughly at the relationships 
between these varying self-definitions and their influence on managers’ responses to different 
external demands. 
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The findings from the present study further indicate that managerial attitudes and 
behaviors cannot be adequately understood when they are viewed in isolation from contextual 
influences. We demonstrate that resource inadequacy, strong political control, and poor 
information quality precipitate the perception of role conflict and decrease the likelihood of a 
purposeful use of performance information. These factors turned out to be more important in 
explaining managers’ difficulties when it comes to performance measurement than a 
professional identity. This insight is important because many public service organizations 
operate under conditions of scarce resources, stringent political control, limited autonomy and 
lack of information (Hupe & van der Krogt, 2013; Moynihan, 2006; Nutt, 2006). We thus 
recommend that scholars consider these constraints in subsequent studies and examine their 
interplay with the attitudes and behaviors of executives who have to implement managerial 
reform programs. This can provide important insights into the challenges for those who try to 
balance the competing requirements in the public and nonprofit sector. It should also be 
mentioned here that our analyses revealed no significant differences between public and 
nonprofit managers with regards to the experience of role conflict and their reliance on 
performance information.4 
 Some limitations of this study must be borne in mind when interpreting the results. 
First, measuring all constructs on the basis of just one survey always raises concerns with 
respect to common source bias (CSB). Nevertheless, George & Pandey (2017) note that the 
risk of CSB is exaggerated for studies that do not use perceptual measures of organizational 
performance. These scholars show that when procedural remedies are taken to reduce the 
potential for CSB, measuring both the independent and dependent variables by a single data 
source does not necessarily and routinely result in spurious results. In the present study, we 
focus on a dependent variable which is less prone to CSB than a self-reported measure of 
performance (cf. Meier & O’Toole, 2010), and we placed the survey items for our main 
constructs in separate parts of the questionnaire in order to minimize the susceptibility for 
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CSB. Further, we found no indication of inflated correlations. A glance at table 1 shows that 
only 18 of the 28 reported correlations (dichotomous control variables and job tenure 
excluded) proved to be statistically significant, indicating that almost 36% of the correlations 
were not significant. Moreover, the relatively low correlations between the study measures 
and additional tests for the discriminant validity of the latent construct do not indicate that 
CSB is a major threat to the validity of our analysis. It should also be noted here that no other 
data source was available for our study and, importantly, that our measures pertain to values, 
beliefs and perceptions of managers, which are very difficult to measure in ways other than 
those used in this study.  
A second limitation of the study is that the results are based on self-reported data. It is 
therefore possible that respondents overestimate the level of performance information use. 
Experimental research designs that allow the observation of actual behavior in real-life 
situations might be an interesting approach for future research to strive for more objective 
data (cf. Kroll, 2015a). Third, one should also bear in mind that the present study was carried 
out in specialized human service organizations in Switzerland. Although the study’s 
generalizability was increased by considering executives with different occupational 
backgrounds and by including organizations from various service domains in the public and 
nonprofit sector, one should be cautious in extrapolating the results to other domains and 
countries. 
Conclusion 
Our research sought to find out whether human service managers’ role identities matter when 
it comes to performance measurement, and our key finding is clear: Role identities affect both 
the experience of role conflict with performance measurement and the utilization of 
performance information. A lack of resources, high levels of political control, and poor 
information quality are also found to be associated with role conflict and a limited use of 
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performance information. Based on this, we can draw the following conclusions for 
managerial reform programs more generally. 
First, there is evidence to suggest that managerial reform objectives are more likely to 
be achieved when executives embrace businesslike values and identify themselves with 
managerial principles. A practical implication of this is that promoters of performance-based 
management should, in addition to the technical aspects, also focus on the people responsible 
for implementation and pursue an influence strategy in order to increase the willingness of 
those individuals to take on a management role and endorse a managerial orientation. This can 
be especially important in human service fields, where executives often have a professional 
background and not necessarily a well-founded management education.  
Proactive attempts to influence beliefs, attitudes, and identities within organizations 
subject to performance interventions can be guided by the approaches discussed in the change 
management literature (e.g. Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993). For example, a strategy 
to develop supportive values and cultures can start with a persuasive change message that 
emphasizes the importance and benefits of (performance) management for leading 
professionals and the wider organization, fosters people’s confidence in their capability to be 
a good manager, and provides support for the relevant training. Further training investments 
directed toward the implementation of management reforms can also help to disseminate 
information about how performance management works, clarify expectations, and improve 
managers’ understanding of how to utilize their discretion to use performance information 
(Kroll & Moynihan, 2015). As well as communication and education, influence strategies can 
also make attempts to guarantee certain forms of participation and discretion that allow the 
inclusion of discrepant views, negotiation, and experimentation with the new requirements 
(Kotter & Schlesinger, 1997). 
Second, the present study illustrates that certain tensions and conflicts may be inherent 
to the role of managerial professionals dealing with performance measurement. It has become 
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apparent, however, that this is not simply a matter of identity. Instead, our findings strongly 
indicate that contextual factors play a significant part in managers’ struggle in aligning new 
role demands with traditional orientations. A practical lesson from this study is that the 
provision of adequate resources and operational flexibility can help to dismiss doubts 
concerning incompatibility between a managerial logic and professional standards. Therefore, 
the setting of stringent requirements concerning the use of management instruments without 
providing the addressees with the requisite resources and autonomy to meet these demands 
should be avoided. 
In conclusion, this article provides important insights into the opportunities and 
difficulties managerial professionals may face when implementing performance measurement. 
We hope that this analysis might encourages further research on the mechanisms through 
which both individual dispositions and context factors contribute to the success of 
contemporary and future reform initiatives. 
Notes 
1 To test for non-response bias in our data, we compared the characteristics of respondents in 
the sample with the population parameters obtained from an administrative data set collected 
by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS, 2015). The three variables of age, gender, and 
job tenure were available for both the respondents and non-respondents (though not for the 
work integration domain, which is why managers in this field were not considered in the non-
response analysis). In our sample, 70 percent of the respondents were male, and 30 percent 
were female. This ratio is comparable to that in the general population (67% men and 33% 
women). The respondents’ average age was 54 years, which is only marginally higher than 
the national average (53 years). The respondents median job tenure fell between 7-9 years, 
which is identical with the population parameter. In sum, the comparison revealed no 
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substantial differences between the respondents in our sample and the population, which 
makes us confident that our further analyses are not distorted by any non-response bias. 
2 Before the hypothesized measurement model was tested, we conducted an explanatory factor 
analysis (EFA) in order to test whether managerial role identity and professional role identity 
are indeed two distinct constructs. We performed an oblique promax rotation because it seems 
plausible that the factors are correlated. The analysis showed two factors that correspond to 
PRI (eigenvalue = 2.28, all item loadings above 0.59 and communalities above 0.40) and MRI 
(eigenvalue = 1.29, all item loadings above 0.61 and communalities above 0.41). Overall, 
each item strongly loads on its expected construct and shows weak cross-loadings (the ladder 
are between -.02 and .07). EFA thus demonstrates that the items used measure two distinct 
concepts. 
3 In order to have an adequately large group size, we combined the facilities for the disabled 
and children and youth institutions in one group. Work integration institutions and facilities 
for drug addicts were also grouped together. We think that this approach is justified here 
because facilities for the disabled often provide services for minors, and substance abuse 
services sometimes include job placement services. 
4 In contrast, some differences were found with regard to performance information use across 
service domains. Additional F-tests confirmed that the level of performance information use is 
significantly higher in nursing homes (mean = 27.7) and significantly lower in children and 
youth institutions (mean = 23.1) than in all other service domains. In the remaining domains, 
managers’ reliance on performance information (mean = 25.3 to 26.4) does not significantly 
vary. 
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Figure 1: Path Coefficients for the Final Structural Model 
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Appendix 1: Study Measures 
 
Performance information use (Cronbach’s alpha = .92) a 
- I regularly use performance information to make decisions. 
- I use performance information to adopt new solutions for old problems. 
- I use performance information to set priorities. 
- I use performance information to identify problems that need attention. 
- I use performance information to track goal achievement. 
 
Role conflict (Cronbach’s alpha = .82) a 
- Looking from my professional values and norms, I embrace performance  
measurement. (R) 
- Performance measurement negatively affects my professional autonomy. 
- In working with performance measurement, I violate my professional ethics. 
- Working with performance measurement conflicts with my values and norms as a 
professional. 
 
Professional role identity (Cronbach’s alpha = .79) a 
- I systematically and regularly read professional journals, websites, etc. for professionals 
in [specific area of human services]. b 
- I regularly attend professional meetings organized for professionals in [specific area of 
human services]. b 
- I am aware of the existence of a code of conduct for human service professions. 
- I believe that professionalism and loyalty to professional rules are the leading values in 
my work. 
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Managerial role identity (Cronbach’s alpha = .80) a 
- My primary role is setting goals and leading people through changes to achieve these 
goals. 
- Efficiency, effectiveness and economy are the key objectives for people in my position. 
- In my job, it is important to ensure control that staff is pursuing the organization's goals 
in a correct and efficient way. 
- It is my job to innovate and ensure change. 
 
Resources for performance measurement (Cronbach’s alpha = .84) a 
- We lack time and money for the measurement of performance and quality. (R) 
- We lack assigned staff who are knowledgeable about gathering and analyzing 
performance information. (R) 
- Our organization has an efficient information system for measuring and analyzing 
performance and quality. 
 
Political control (Cronbach’s alpha = .74) a 
- The law and regulations relating to [specific area of human services] are too detailed. b 
- The executive board does not have enough autonomy and independence from politics to 
manage the organization in an effective way. 
- [Specific type of human service organizations] are overregulated and too much 
controlled by the state. c 
 
Information quality (Cronbach’s alpha = .92) d 
How do you assess the quality of the performance information in your organization as regards 
the following dimensions? 
- Tangibility 
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- Steering relevance 
- Reliability 
- Timeliness 
- Overall quality 
 
Goal clarity (Cronbach’s alpha = .74) a 
- This organization's mission is clear to almost everyone who works here. 
- It is easy to explain the goals of this organization to outsiders. 
- This organization has clearly defined goals. 
 
Ownership (public) 
What is the legal form of your facility? (coded as 1= public, 0 = nonprofit) 
 
Gender (male) 
Are you male or female? (coded as 1= male, 0 = female) 
 
Job tenure 
How many years have you been in your current position? (coded as 1= less than 1 year, 2 = 1-
3 years, 3 = 4-6 years, 4 = 7-9 years, 5 = 10 and more years) 
 
Note: (R) Reverse worded. 
a. Items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (= strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree). 
b. Areas of human services were: the long-term care sector, the special needs sector, the 
work integration sector, the addiction treatment sector, the child and youth sector 
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c. Types of human service organizations were: nursing homes, facilities for the disabled, 
work integration institutions, children and youth institutions, facilities for drug addicts 
d. Items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (= very poor) to 7 
(excellent). 
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Appendix 2: Properties of the Measurement Model 
 
Constructs and  
Indicators 
Loadingsa Z-value 
Error 
Varianceb 
IRc CRd AVEe 
Performance information use .912 .675 
PIU1  .914   .165  .835   
PIU2 .866  36.446  .250  .750   
PIU3 .837  33.568  .299  .701   
PIU4 .742  25.464  .449  .551   
PIU5  .734  19.413  .461  .539   
Professional role identity .782 .483 
PRI1  .915   .163  .837   
PRI2  .565  14.714  .680  .320   
PRI3  .651  17.614  .577  .423   
PRI4  .593  15.574  .649  .551   
Managerial role identity .795 .502 
MRI1  .923   .148  .852   
MRI2  .659  16.038  .565  .435   
MRI3  .594  14.635  .647  .353   
MRI4  .605  13.185  .633  .367   
Role conflict .811 .520 
RCON1  .664   .559  .441   
RCON2 .689  24.107  .525  .475   
RCON3 .685  11.834  .531  .469   
RCON4 .833  12.207  .306  .694   
Resources for performance measurement .854 .665 
RESRC1  .882   .222  .778   
RESRC2 .875  24.424  .234  .766   
RESRC3 .672  18.500  .549  .451   
Political control .756 .513 
PCNTR1  .859   .262  .738   
PCNTR2 .641  13.215  .589  .411   
PCNTR3 .625  12.460  .609  .391   
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Appendix 2: Properties of the Measurement Model (continued) 
 
Information quality .918 .691 
QUALITY1  .902   .186  .814   
QUALITY2 .836  31.495  .301  .699   
QUALITY3 .843  30.617  .289  .711   
QUALITY4 .781  27.107  .390  .610   
QUALITY5 .789  26.824  .377  .623   
Goal clarity .744 .495 
CLRTY1  .794   .370  .630   
CLRTY2 .654  12.374  .572  .428   
CLRTY3 .653  12.854  .573  .427   
a Loadings are standardized (p < 0.01 for all). 
b calculated as 1 minus the indicator reliability 
c Indicator reliability (IR) indicates the percent of variation in each indicator that is accounted 
for by the factor to which it was assigned, calculated as the square of the standardized factor 
loading. Values greater than 0.39 are considered ideal. 
d Composite reliability (CR) is analogous to Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, and reflects the 
internal consistency of indicators measuring a given factor. Values should generally be greater 
than 0.69. 
e Average variance extracted estimates (AVE) are calculated to assess the amount of variance 
captured by factors in relation to variance attributable to measurement error. Constructs 
should have variance extracted estimates greater 0.49. 
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Appendix 3: Model Fit Statistics from Confirmatory Factor Analyses for Multi-group Invariance Testing
Model Restriction c
2
(df) c
2
/df RMSEA SRMR TLI CFI DCFI Dc
2
Ddf Decision
0 Hypothesized measurement model - 760 (398) 1.91 .035 .048 .957 .963    accepted
1 Configural MI - 1690 (1194) 1.42 .041 .061 .942 .951    accepted
2 Metric (weak) MI Factor loadings 1741 (1240) 1.40 .040 .063 .944 .950 .001 51 46 accepted
3a Scalar (strong) MI Factor loadings, intercepts 1861 (1286) 1.45 .043 .065 .938 .943 .007 120** 46 rejected
3b Partial MI
c
Factor loadings, intercepts 1776 (1270) 1.40 .040 .064 .945 .950 .000 29 30 accepted
4 Factor variance invariance Factor loadings, intercepts, factor variances 1801 (1286) 1.40 .040 .074 .944 .949 .001 16 25 accepted
5 Factor covariance invariance
Factor loadings, intercepts, factor variances, factor 
covariances 1877 (1342) 1.40 .040 .080 .945 .947 .002 76 56 accepted
6 Configural MI - 1143 (796) 1.44 .034 .054 .958 .964    accepted
7 Metric (weak) MI Factor loadings 1169 (819) 1.43 .034 .053 .959 .964 .000 26 23 accepted
8 Scalar (strong) MI Factor loadings, intercepts 1201 (842) 1.43 .034 .054 .959 .963 .001 32 23 accepted
9 Factor variance invariance Factor loadings, intercepts, factor variances 1204 (850) 1.42 .033 .056 .960 .964 .001 3 8 accepted
10 Factor covariance invariance
Factor loadings, intercepts, factor variances, factor 
covariances 1240 (878) 1.41 .033 .060 .961 .963 .001 36 28 accepted
Notes: N  = 742, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05; MI= measurement invariance; c
2 
= chi-square discrepancy; df  = degrees of freedom; c
2
/df = chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio; RMSEA = root mean square error
of approximation; SRMR = root mean squared residual; CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker Lewis index; Dc2 = difference in chi-square; Ddf = difference in degrees of freedom; c in the partial MI model, 
seven parameters are allowed to vary across groups.
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